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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Appeal was taken by right to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Rules 3 and 
4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which poured-over the case to the Utah Court 
of Appeals. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to § 78A-4-
103Q) Utah Code Ann. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented to this Court for determination, together with their attendant 
standards of review follow: 
Issue No. 1: Did the District Court plainly err by denying DesignScape due process 
in allowing Bonneville's counsel to proceed with an trial in absentia, despite Bonneville's 
failure to comply in any way with discovery rules, including disclosures, production of 
documents, a witness list, or at a minimum to even hold an attorneys' planning meeting?1 
Determinative Law: United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment; Utah 
Constitution, Section 7; Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 37, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure; State v. Cabo, 90 Utah 89, 102, 60 P.2d 952, 958-59 (1936) (plain error is 
"palpable error on the face of the record" or "manifest error"); United States v. Granville, 
1
 Notwithstanding DesignScape's active involvement and ardent defense posture in 
this case, and Bonneville's failure to adhere to the discovery or scheduling rules required 
by rules 26 and 37, URCP, Judge Connors still moved forward with the absentia bench 
trial on April 9, 2008. No evidence was taken at trial, only a mere proffer by attorney 
Kevin P. Sullivan is noted in the record. 
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716 F.2d 819, 821 (11th Cir. 1983) (plain error must be "obvious and substantial"); United 
States v. Fowler, 605 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1979) ("plain error is...obvious..."), cert, 
denied, 445 U.S. 950, 63 L. Ed. 2d 785, 100 C. Ct. 1599 (1980). 
Standard of Review: Manifest injustice or error is synonymous with the "plain 
error" standard. An appellate court must reverse where an Appellant demonstrates that the 
error(s) below was: (1) obvious, and (2) of sufficient magnitude so as to have affected the 
substantial rights of a party-in-interest. 
Issue No. 2: Did the District Court abuse its discretion by not setting aside the 
"Order" [Judgment] below, owing to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect 
on the part of DesignScape or its counsel?2 
Determinative Law: Rules 55( c), 59(a) and 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla Development Corp., 611 P.2d 369, 371 (Utah 1980); 
State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983); Erickson v. Schenkers Int'lForwarders, 
Inc., 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994); Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 10-11, 11 P.3d 277. 
2
 The District Court imposed a condition that DesignScape pay $1,250.00 in 
attorneys fees as a condition to vacating the Order [Judgment]. Bonneville's underlying 
claim in this case is for $979.49. At most, a reasonable attorney's fee in this matter to 
collect that amount would be about $325.00. The imposition of $1,250.00 as a condition 
to setting aside the Order [Judgment] is tantamount to a penalty or fine being imposed 
upon DesignScape for exercising its rights - as the amount of that condition exceeds the 
claim itself by 128% - and is 384% greater than a reasonable attorney's fee for this type 
of litigation. 
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Standard of Review: This Court will reverse instances where the adjudication 
below has resulted in an abuse or the "exceeding" of discretion. 
Issue No, 3: Did the District Court abuse its discretion by failing to dismiss the 
proceeding below for lack of jurisdiction? 
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. § 54-8a; Rule 12(h)(2), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Standard of Review: This Court will reverse instances where the adjudication 
below has resulted in an abuse or the "exceeding" of discretion. 
Issue No. 4: Did the District Court abuse its discretion by sua sponte converting 
Bonneville's cause of action from a statutory3 "Blue Stakes" claim to one of negligent 
property damage? 
Determinative Law: Rules 55( c), 59(a) and 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla Development Corp., 611 P.2d 369, 371 (Utah 1980); 
State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983); Erickson v. Schenkers Int'lForwarders, 
Inc., 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994); Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 10-11, 11 P.3d 277. 
Standard of Review: This Court will reverse instances where the adjudication 
below has resulted in an abuse or the "exceeding" of discretion. 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 54-8a. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment [Due process of law] 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws (emphasis added). 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7 [Due process of law] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-8a-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Association" means two or more operators organized to receive notification of 
excavation activities in a specified area, as provided by Section 54-8a-9. 
(2) "Board" means the Underground Facilities Damage Dispute Board created in Section 
54-8a-13. 
(3) "Emergency" means an occurrence or suspected natural gas leak necessitating 
immediate action to prevent or mitigate loss of, or damage to, life, health, property, or 
essential public services. 
(4) "Excavate" or "excavation" means an operation in which earth, rock, or other material 
on or below the ground is moved or displaced by tools, equipment, or explosives. 
(5) "Excavator" means any person or entity that excavates or conducts excavation activities. 
(6) "48 hours" means a 48-hour period occurring during business days which includes any 
day except Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday. 
(7) "Hand tool" means an implement: 
(a) powered by hand; or 
(b) designed to avoid damaging an underground facility, including a vacuum excavation 
tool and air knife. 
(8) "Location" means the site of a proposed area of excavation described by: 
(a) (I) street address, if available; and 
(ii) the area at that street address to be excavated; or 
(b) if there is no street address available, the area of excavation using any available 
designations, including a nearby street or road, an intersection, GPS coordinates, or other 
generally accepted methods (emphasis added). 
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(9) "Location request assignment" means a number assigned to a proposed excavation by 
an association or operator upon receiving notice of the proposed excavation from the excavator. 
(10) (a) "Operator" means a person who owns, operates, or maintains an underground facility, 
(b) "Operator" does not include an owner of real property where underground facilities are: 
(I) located within: 
(A) the owner's property; or 
(B) a public street adjacent to the owner's property, a right-of-way adjacent to the owner's 
property, or a public utility easement adjacent to the owner's property; 
(ii) used exclusively to furnish services to the owner's property; and 
(iii) maintained under the operation and control of that owner. 
(11) "Person" includes: 
(a) an individual, government entity, corporation, partnership, association, or company; and 
(b) the trustee, receiver, assignee, and personal representative of a person listed in 
Subsection (11 )(a). 
(12) "Sewer lateral cleanout" means a point of access where a sewer lateral can be serviced. 
(13) "24 hours" means a 24-hour period, excluding hours occurring during a Saturday, 
2. Sunday, or a legal holiday. 
(14) "Underground facility" means personal property that is buried or placed below ground 
level for use in the storage or conveyance of any of the following: 
(a) water; 
(b) sewage, including sewer laterals; 
© communications, including electronic, photonic, telephonic, or telegraphic communications; 
(d) television, cable television, or other telecommunication signals, including transmission 
to subscribers of video or other programming; 
(e) electric power; 
(f) oil, gas, or other fluid and gaseous substances; 
(g) steam; 
(h) slurry; or 
(I) dangerous materials or products. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52. Findings by the court; correction of the 
record. 
2. (a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and 
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8A; in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for 
purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
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shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a 
master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the 
court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally 
and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court 
shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more 
than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of 
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the 
judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to 
Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the 
question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised 
whether or not the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a 
motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(c)(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(c)(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(c)(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(d) Correction of the record. If anything material is omitted from or misstated in the 
transcript of an audio or video record of a hearing or trial, or if a disagreement arises as to 
whether the record accurately discloses what occurred in the proceeding, a party may move 
to correct the record. The motion must be filed within 10 days after the transcript of the 
hearing is filed, unless good cause is shown. The omission, misstatement or disagreement 
shall be resolved by the court and the record made to accurately reflect the proceeding. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
2. (a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order 
from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report 
of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments shall state whether they are 
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entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative; and, unless otherwise 
directed by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one 
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or 
third party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry 
of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon 
an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer 
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not 
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of 
decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the 
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every 
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given 
for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among 
themselves. 
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or 
exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a 
statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing 
party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other 
proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with 
such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the 
cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to 
the extent permitted by law. 
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry 
of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a 
memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file 
with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge 
the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the 
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action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days 
after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by 
the court. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent 
to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry 
of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the date judgment is 
entered. 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any 
judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was 
rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, within 
two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not included in 
the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, 
and make a similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55. Default 
2. (a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has 
failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to 
appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the 
amount claimed and costs against the defendant if: 
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear ; 
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person; 
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and 
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be made 
certain by computation. 
(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply 
to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into 
effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to 
establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other 
matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary 
and proper. 
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(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default 
and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance 
with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether 
the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party 
who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment by default is 
subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default shall 
be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or agency thereof unless the 
claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
2. (a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record 
and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any 
time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the 
court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before 
the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On 
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic 
or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment 
is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment 
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable 
that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a 
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or 
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by 
an independent action. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
This is an appeal from a final "Order" of the Second Judicial District Court, Davis 
County, Layton Department, in favor of Plaintiff and Appellee, Bonneville Billing and 
Collections ("Bonneville"), signed by Judge Thomas L. Kay4 on April 2, 2010, and filed 
with the Clerk of the Court on April 9, 2010. However, the Order which is the subject of 
this appeal was a follow-on to a previously deficient order, rejected by this Court, denying 
DesignScape's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, that was entered below without any 
findings of fact or conclusions of law, on March 16, 2009.5 
As Judge David M. Connors wrote in his "Ruling and Order" below of March 12, 
2010, this case "has a long and tortured procedural history." DesignScape couldn't agree 
more, that the steps it has had to take to defend against Bonneville's claim should never 
have had to occur. This should have been a simple case summarily disposed of early in the 
proceedings. That was not possible though, because Bonneville and the District Court 
chose a path that was fundamentally unfair to and denied DesignScape of its due process 
4
 Although Judge Kay signed the order, the proceedings below were presided over 
by Judge David M. Connors. Judge Connors heard all of the relevant, underlying motions 
below relating to this appeal. 
5
 Despite DesignScape's zealous defense throughout the proceedings below, this 
appeal essentially arises from a default judgment, effectuated by way of an "absentia" 
bench trial held April 9, 2008. To the point, DesignScape highlights that no Findings of 
Fact or Conclusions of Law relating to the absentia trial were entered below, as required 
by Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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rights, example, the Complaint in the District Court was filed on September 19, 2006. 
DesignScape ultimately asserted that the Complaint did not properly invoke the 
jurisdiction of the Second Judicial District Court, because on its face it fails to plead or 
aver the prerequisites of Utah Code Ann. § 54-8a, namely, that (1) Bonneville is a "Public 
Utility" or "Operator" authorized to seek a civil penalty for a "Blue Stakes" violation, and 
(2) the address location (including at a minimum a complete street address and city and 
state), GPS coordinates, or some other means of properly identifying the allegedly 
damaged property, and (3) the "Blue Stakes" claim was properly assigned by the real 
parties-in-interest to Bonneville - those parties ostensibly being Rocky Mountain Power 
and the State of Utah. The deficiencies would have been borne-out had DesignScape been 
permitted to illuminate them through the discovery process that was denied in this case.6 
Aside from the lack of jurisdiction of the District Court, the underlying basis for the 
appeal in this case, is that the District Court denied DesignScape's motion to set aside the 
default and absentia bench trial Order [judgment], owing to mistake, inadvertence or 
excusable neglect on the part of DesignScape's undersigned counsel. 
6
 At least four "pre-trial conferences" were scheduled in the District Court, and 
three of which were conducted with DesignScape's active participation. Interestingly, 
while those events are called pre-trials, no judge participated in them. They were 
effectively mediations. 
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II. Statement of Facts 
In September 2006, Bonneville, a collection agency, filed a "debt collection" 
lawsuit against DesignScape, purportedly on behalf of Rocky Mountain Power, for a 
statutory "Blue Stakes" damage claim under Utah Code Ann. § 54-8(a)l.7 The Complaint 
below does not aver or allege any of the prerequisites found in § 54-8(a), sufficiently to 
have invoked the jurisdiction of the Second Judicial District Court, including: (1) that 
Bonneville is a "Public Utility" or "Operator" authorized to seek a civil penalty for a "Blue 
Stakes" violation, (2) the address location (including street address and city and state, GPS 
coordinates, or some other means of identifying the allegedly damaged property), and (3) 
that the "Blue Stakes" claim was properly assigned by the real parties-in-interest to 
Bonneville, ostensibly those parties being Rocky Mountain Power and the State of Utah. 
DesignScape timely filed its answer and submitted to at least four pre-trial and/or 
mediation conferences below, contesting Bonneville's claims at every juncture. 
The last pre-trial and/or mediation was scheduled for January 9, 2008. Counsel 
for both parties communicated regarding that setting and concluded that it would be a 
waste of time to hold another such proceeding. At that point in time the undersigned 
attorney requested Bonneville to proceed with discovery. Surprisingly, a trial setting for 
April 9, 2008, arrived in DesignScape's counsel's mail not long after the scratched pre-
7
 Since no discovery was conducted below, and an absentia trial was held with no 
evidence being taken, it is unknown if Bonneville even had the standing to proceed with 
its claim. 
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trial. Admittedly, the undersigned mistakenly entered the trial date on her calendar for 
April 16, 2008, rather than April 9, 2008, and waited for Bonneville's counsel to 
commence discovery. As the trial date approached, a meeting was scheduled between the 
undersigned and DesignScape personnel for April 9, 2008, to decide how to proceed in the 
absence of any discovery on Bonneville's part. DesignScape concluded at that meeting to 
proceed with its own discovery. However, the trial calendar mistake was discovered by 
the undersigned, whereupon a review of the docket revealed that Bonneville and the Court 
had proceeded with an absentia bench trial on April 9, 2008, without any further notice to 
the undersigned or DesignScape, and wholly lacking any discovery or the taking of 
evidence. In fact, the record reflects that the Court did not inquire as to any certification 
of readiness for trial, and merely accepted a proffer from Bonneville's attorneys, awarding 
Bonneville: (l)money damages of $979.49, (2) prejudgment interest of 10% per annum 
from April 13, 2005, (3) a civil penalty of $500, (4) "a reasonable attorney's fee," and (5) 
costs.8 The District Court entered no Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law in 
connection with the Order [Judgment]. 
On April 29, 2008, DesignScape filed its "Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment" 
and supporting memorandum, one month before the actual Order was even signed and 
8
 Neither the attorney's fee nor the costs were actually set by the Court in the 
written Order prepared by Bonneville's counsel. 
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entered by the Court on May 28, 2009.9 
DesignScape's Motion to Set Aside was ignored and languished in the District 
Court for more than half-a-year, until the undersigned inquired of the Court and was told 
that Judge Connors would not proceed without having a proposed order from 
DesignScape, and notice to submit for decision. Whereupon, the undersigned supplied 
additional memoranda to the Court and filed a Request to Submit for Decision, and 
Request for Hearing. 
On January 14, 2009, DesignScape's Motion to Set Aside came on for hearing. The 
District Court granted DesignScape's Motion to Set Aside,10 upon the onerous condition 
that DesignScape pay $1,250.00 in attorney's fees within ten (10) days. That condition 
was not met, and a first appeal ensued in this matter after the District Court withdrew its 
grant of the Motion to Set Aside and entered the substitute Order denying DesignScape's 
motion. 
This Court ruled on August 27, 2009, by Memorandum Decision in earlier Case 
Number 200903 95-C A, that the Order appealed from was not final, or alternatively 
DesignScape's appeal was not timely, and that this Court lacked jurisdiction. 
9
 DesignScape's undersigned counsel did not want to wait before taking action to 
redress the absentia bench trial and make a record of DesignScape's position with respect 
to the irregular proceedings in the District Court. 
10
 It is telling that the District Court granted the Motion to Set Aside based upon 
DesignScape's rationale and argument, but effectively denied the same by imposing an 
abusive economic sanction (and even directed the losing party (Bonneville's counsel) to 
prepare the order granting DesignScape's motion). 
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Before any alternative final judgment or order could be entered by the District 
Court, DesignScape immediately moved that Court on August 28, 2009, to arrest the entry 
of any judgment, and to dismiss the case altogether for lack of jurisdiction. That motion 
was denied on March 12, 2010. 
This appeal of right, challenging the denial of DesignScape's motions to set aside, 
arrest entry of judgment, and to dismiss for lack or jurisdiction, ensued. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
DesignScape brought a timely motion to set aside the judgment below under Rule 
60(b)(1). Judge David Connors initially granted that motion, but imposed a condition that 
DesignScape pay $1,250 in attorneys fees to Plaintiff and Appellee. That fee amount was 
128% greater than the entire claim for damages below. Ultimately, DesignScape did not 
pay the attorneys fees and Judge Connors withdrew his conditional grant of the motion to 
set aside the judgment, and entered a denial of the same upon the record. Ironically, Judge 
Connors later concluded that attorneys fees were not permissible in this case at all. 
Therefore, the condition of attorneys fees attached to the grant of DesignScape's motion to 
set aside the judgment, should have been removed and the successful grant of the motion 
to set aside reinstated. 
Plaintiff and Appellee's failure to adhere to Rule 26 discovery rules, constituted a 
denial of DesignScape's due process rights. Absolutely no adherence to Rule 26 occurred 
below, including no attorneys planning meeting, initial disclosures, or a witness list. 
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The Complaint below wholly failed to plead or aver any of the requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-8a, namely, that (1) Bonneville is a "Public Utility" or "Operator" 
authorized to seek a civil penalty for a "Blue Stakes" violation, and (2) the address 
location (including at a minimum a complete street address and city and state), GPS 
coordinates, or some other means of properly identifying the allegedly damaged property, 
and (3) the "Blue Stakes" claim was properly assigned by the real parties-in-interest to 
Bonneville - those parties ostensibly being Rocky Mountain Power and the State of Utah. 
Accordingly, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case at all. 
Somehow Judge Connors, seemingly for the purpose of attempting to shape a 
square peg into a round role, transformed the case below from a statutory "Blue Stakes" 
claim into one of negligent property damage. It is almost as though the Judge was 
practicing law as counsel for and on behalf of the Plaintiff and Appellee, to craft a 
winning strategy, despite the facts and manner is which the Complaint was pled. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT COMPLY WITH RULES 52,54 
OR 55 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
In cases tried upon the facts, but not tried before a jury, Rule 52 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure dictates that a court enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in all 
actions. Rule 54 ( c)(2) and Rule 55 describe the procedure to be followed by trial courts 
in entering judgments against defaulting parties. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (1984); 
accord, Hayes v. Towels, 95 Idaho 208, 506 P.2d 105 (1973). None of the procedures 
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required by Rules 52, 54 or 55 were observed by the District Court in the case below. 
After an absentia trial, put on by Plaintiffs and Appellee's counsel and the District Court, 
no findings of fact or conclusions of law were filed with the clerk of the court or entered 
on the docket. 
IL DESIGNSCAPE'S TIMELY RULE 60(b)(1) MOTION TO SET 
JUDGMENT [ORDER] SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 
WITHOUT A CONDITION IMPOSING ATTORNEYS FEES. 
Since the District Court saw fit to accept DesignScape's justification for relief 
under Rule 60(b)(1), the condition imposed granting $1,250 in attorneys fees to the 
opposing side was onerous and ultimately determined by the very same judge to be 
inappropriate. Judge Connors later ruled to delete attorneys fees from Plaintiffs and 
Appellee's claim altogether, finding that "the Court, in further reviewing Chapter 8a of 
Title 54 of the Utah Code, finds no provision requiring payment of attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party, other than in the situation where the parties avail themselves of the 
statute's arbitration provisions, which were not an issue in this case. The Court does not 
find this to be a case where attorney's fees should be awarded under Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-5-825, because the Court has no reason to believe the defendant acted in bad faith." 
Judge David M. Connors, Ruling and Order, March 12, 2010. 
The District Court's own final stance on attorneys fees in this matter should 
ameliorate the attorneys fee condition of DesignScape's otherwise successful request to 
have the judgment [order] set aside below. 
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III. THE CASE BELOW DID NOT PROPERLY INVOKE THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT AS REQUIRED BY 
UTAH CODE ANN, TITLE 54 Chapter 8a § 12, 
A "Blue Stakes" claim under Utah Code Ann. § 54-8a may only be brought by the 
real party-in-interest, not an assignee. Title 54, Chapter 8a § 12 contemplates that the 
Utah Attorney General is actually charged with the responsibility of enforcing civil penalty 
actions under that title. However, in the event the Attorney General does not bring an 
action under Subsection 1(a), then an "operator" or "excavator" may pursue in any 
remedy, including a civil penalty. That does not mean that an assignee is conferred with 
the statutory authority to bring enforcement actions though. The statute is completely 
silent as to any assignment of claims. In the absence of plain language permitting claims 
under Title 54 to be assigned, they cannot be prosecuted by anyone other than a real party-
in-interest. Bonneville does not fit into that definition, in the proceeding below, and has 
never asserted in any event that they are a real party-in-interest. Accordingly, Bonneville 
had no standing to have complained against DesignScape below. 
Even if Bonneville had standing to commence a "Blue Stakes" and civil penalty 
case against DesignScape, the Complaint did not plead or aver the essential elements 
required by Chapter 8a. namely, that (1) Bonneville is a "Public Utility" or "Operator" 
authorized to seek a civil penalty for a "Blue Stakes" violation, and (2) the address 
location (including at a minimum a complete street address and city and state), GPS 
coordinates, or some other means of properly identifying the allegedly damaged property, 
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and (3) the "Blue Stakes" claim was properly assigned by the real parties-in-interest to 
Bonneville - those parties ostensibly being Rocky Mountain Power and the State of Utah. 
In the absence of the prerequisites to invoke the District Court's jurisdiction, that court 
could not entertain the case at all. DesignScape raised jurisdiction as soon as it became 
apparent that the District Court could not hear the case. Rule 12(h)(2), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, provides "that whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise 
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action 
(emphasis added).'5 In this instance, the District Court was advised by DesignScape by at 
least August 2009 that jurisdiction was being challenged. It would have come out earlier, 
had there been discovery in the case. Nevertheless, Rule 12(h)(2) does not create 
minimizing or limiting language or restrictions as to when a question of jurisdiction may 
be raised by a party or otherwise. The District Court, for that matter, could have sua 
sponte suggested that a jurisdictional problem existed. 
The Complaint was not properly pled on many levels. It does not conform to the 
averment the requirements of Title 54, Chapter 12 § 8a, in any respect. For example, it 
cannot be ascertained from the Complaint where the ostensibly damaged property is 
located with specificity. There is no complete address location cited (including not even 
the county or state wherein the property can be found). There is no claim as to the status 
of the Bonneville. Is the entity an "Public Utility" or an "Operator" as defined by § 8a? 
The real party-in-interest is not identified, i.e. Rocky Mountain Power, and no assignment 
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of the claim to Bonneville is attached to the Complaint. The Utah Attorney General is not 
enforcing the claim, yet the Complaint fails to assert whether the Attorney General even 
considered the claim and/or declined to commence an enforcement action. 
What the Complaint below purports to do, is supplant Bonneville for the Utah 
Attorney General, and to prosecute a statutory civil penalty claim for and on behalf of the 
people of the State of Utah, as a private entity. It is highly unlikely that the State of Utah 
intended such proxy, and no assignment of the State's interest is in any way asserted. 
There is no way that a logical and reasoned legal analysis could produce any 
argument to validly support Bonneville's claims below against DesignScape. Since the 
District Court's jurisdiction was not invoked, Judge Connors should have dismissed the 
case as required by Rule 12(h)(2), URCP. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT CANNOT TRANSFORM THE CLAIM(S) 
BROUGHT BY BONNEVILLE FROM A "BLUE STAKES" CLAIM 
TO ONE OF NEGLIGENT DAMAGE. 
Clearly this argument is not central to this case, although the undersign counsel felt 
it important to bring to this Court's attention that, while neither party requested Judge 
Connors to change the basis of the lawsuit, he did so in his ruling and order of March 12, 
2010. It appears that the Judge did so as a means of attempting to uphold what he had 
done during the proceeding in the past. Counsel does not mean to cast any untoward 
aspersions with respect to the Judge. It is confusing, and indeed curious though that Judge 
Conners decided to completely change the character of the case to one of negligent 
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damage, from a "Blue Stakes" claim. There may be similarities between the underlying 
claims in terms of the doctrines at law, nevertheless, Bonneville elected to proceed under 
claimed statutory authority to recover damages, and a civil penalty, and attorneys fees 
from DesignScape, for an on behalf of a purported assignor and the people of the State of 
Utah. Judge Connors concluded that he would simply restate the case as one of simple 
negligent damage. How does that occur, absent a desire on the part of at least one of the 
parties? 
CONCLUSION 
DesignScape's due process rights were violated below when a default order 
[judgment] was entered against DesignScape without the proper procedural rules being 
followed. A timely motion to set aside the judgment brought by DesignScape, and 
effectively denied by the District Court through the imposition of some sort of penalty 
attorneys fees (later determined to be inapplicable by the same court). The District Court 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case and subject-matter below, and without motion by either 
party, transformed the case from a statutory "Blue Stakes" claim to one of negligent 
damage. 
DesignScape respectfully requests this Court to reverse the District Court's order 
below, and to direct that the case be dismissed, and for such other and further legal and 
equitable relief as this Court may deem just, including awarding DesignScape attorneys 
fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 for this case having been brought in bad faith. 
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DATED this 7th day of January, 2011. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Sarah J. Beck 
Attorney for DesignScape, LLC 
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